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COMPENSATING PRIVATE PARTIES FOR
TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION INJURY
Pollution has been accepted as an unavoidable price of mate-
rial advancement and an inevitable result of an expanding indus-
trial base.' Acceptable levels of pollution are determined by politi-
cal processes that either expressly or implicitly balance social costs
against economic benefits.' Consequently, less developed nations
are prepared to accept relatively high levels of pollution in return
for economic growth, while more advanced nations can afford the
luxury of emphasizing the "quality of life."3 Pollution, however, re-
1 See J. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 22 (1970). The level of pollution in the
United States has increased in direct proportion to the increase in industrial production
that occurred during and after World War II. See id. at 21-22. Pollution levels also are
affected by the higher standard of living associated with an affluent industrial society. See
AIR CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI-
ENCES, PUB. No. 80, SUMMARY OF THE FACTS (1965), reprinted in POLLUTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 126, 128 (1973); see also A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 16 (1975) (motor vehicle emissions account for approximately one-half of the air
pollution in the United States). Environmental deterioration, however, is not wholly attribu-
table to industrialization. See Fischer, Acid Rain: Deploying Private Damage Actions
Against Transboundary Polluters, TRAL, Apr. 1983, at 56, 57. Large populations produce a
concomitant growth in the size and number of urban communities. See J. DAVIES, supra, at
22. Urbanization, in turn, interacts synergistically with pollutants and weather conditions to
increase ecological instability. Fischer, supra, at 57-58; see Note, Restoring the Water Qual-
ity of the Great Lakes: The Joint Commitment of Canada and the United States, 4 CAN.-
U.S.L.J. 208, 209 (1981).
2 See J. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 18-19; E. HAEELE, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 39-41 (1973); Beal, Foreword to COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS at xiii (1982). Cost-benefit
analyses of environmental regulations are consulted in allocating scarce resources, maximiz-
ing investments in pollution control devices, and encouraging agencies with limited funds to
be cost efficient in choosing regulatory alternatives. See Liroff, Cost-Benefit Analyses in
Environmental Regulation: Will it Clear the Air or Muddy the Water? in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS 1, 2-3, 9-11
(1982).
3 See J. DAVIES, supra note 1, at 22; J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION
7-8 (1975). It has been noted that:
If the United States were not an advanced industrial nation with a booming
economy, it is doubtful that either the public or the government could be induced
to pay much attention to pollution. Concern with pollution is a luxury in the sense
that a nation ... preoccupied with obtaining sufficient food, clothing, and shelter
will not have the time or inclination to worry about [it].... Important as the
pollution problem may be, it is less important than the more obvious prerequisites
for survival.
TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION
spects neither political nor natural boundaries.4 Indeed, interna-
tional trade considerations and disparate environmental regula-
tions are incentives to develop industries near a national border,
thus increasing the likelihood of transnational environmental
repercussions." Despite a heightened degree of public awareness
and involvement in ecological rehabilitation, regulation of transna-
tional pollution has been hampered by conflicting priorities and
the lack of tangible incentives to mitigate injuries occurring in
other nations.6 While some progress has been made through trea-
J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra, at 7-8.
4 J. DAviEs & B. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 166, 220. Marine pollution must be considered
"a problem of global dimensions." Teclaff, International Law and the Protection of the
Oceans from Pollution, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 561 (1972). Of course, radioactive emis-
sions from nuclear mishaps present a more serious danger to the global environment. See
generally Billingsley, Private Party Protection Against Transnational Radiation Pollution
Through Compulsory Arbitration: A Proposal, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 339, 339-42
(1982) (growth in nuclear industry and concomitant increased risk of pollution); Handl,
Managing Nuclear Wastes: The International Connection, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 267, 281-
85 (1981) (long-term buildup of nuclear waste can affect distant world populations). Pol-
luted air is the most commonly cited example of a pollution problem with a transboundary
impact. See Davila, Air Pollution Control on the United States-Mexico Border: Interna-
tional Considerations, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 545, 546 (1972).
Transnational pollution may be defined as a substance that "originates in one nation,
moves through a natural medium such as air or water, and imposes harmful effects in an-
other nation." Comment, Liability for Transnational Pollution Arising from Offshore Oil
Development: A Methodological Approach, 10 EcoLoGY L.Q. 641, 641 (1983). One commen-
tator asserts that pollution should be defined, not to denote any change in an environment,
but to denote "a threshold level of damage or interference which is legally significant."
Springer, Towards A Meaningful Concept of Pollution in International Law, 26 INr'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 531, 532 (1977). Therefore, any international definition of pollution must include
criteria with which to identify polluting activities, their by-products, and unacceptable
levels of environment alteration. Id. at 556.
5 See Tolivia, Problemas y Perspectivas de la Calidad del Aire en la Frontera, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1141, 1145 (1982) (trans.). In a competitive marketplace, industry tends to
locate in "the most hospitable regulatory surroundings." Note, Economic Implications of
European Transfrontier Pollution-National Prerogative and Attribution of Responsibil-
ity, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 519, 525-26 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Economic Implica-
tions]. For example, in an effort to reduce high unemployment, the Mexican Government
implemented a comprehensive development plan for maquiladoras, or border industries.
See J. HERGET & J. CAhuL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEXIcAN LEGAL SYsTEM 67 (1978).
Mexico encourages foreign investment in maquiladoras by offering tax exemptions and
long-term leases, on the condition that Mexican labor is employed and all products are ex-
ported. Id. at 67-68; see Note, International Legal Implications of Industrial Development
Along the Mexican-U.S. Border, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 567, 570-72 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Legal Implications].
6 See J. DAVIES & B. DAViES, supra note 3, at 6-9. Nations possess disparate shares of
the earth's resources and interpret customary rules of international environmental responsi-
bility differently. See Hoffman, State Responsibility in International Law and Trans-
boundary Pollution Injuries, 25 INT'L & CoM'p. L.Q. 509, 509 (1976). While some developing
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ties and international conventions,' environmental legislation," and
the institution of civil and criminal proceedings against polluting
entities, 9 such solutions have not provided reasonable and practical
nations will concede that international environmental standards are essential to protect the
global ecosystem, see Kindt, The Effect of Claims by Developing Countries on LOS Inter-
national Marine Pollution Negotiations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 313, 326 (1980), they are
threatened more by economic disaster than by environmental deterioration, see id. at 318.
Because pollution abatement is not a primary goal of Third World nations, they are unlikely
to accede to international environmental regulations that restrict their development. See id.
at 318-19. Indeed, developing countries often maintain lenient pollution abatement require-
ments to encourage pollution intensive industries to locate in their countries. See Economic
Implications, supra note 5, at 526. Even developed nations cannot afford the economic or
political costs of abating pollution that impacts upon their neighbors. See R. SANSOM, THE
NEw AMERicAN DREAM MAcHE 61-62 (1976). The economic and political power of large
industries is substantial and often is used to circumscribe both the regulatory power of legis-
latures and the scope of environmental regulation. See, e.g., id. at 59-61 (regulatory poten-
tial of Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 never realized because
administration was committed to the goals of large agribusinesses); see J. DAvIEs & B. DA-
VIES, supra note 3, at 221.
E.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, E/ECE/
1010, T.I.A.S. No. 10541 (agreement on exchange of information and research for purpose of
preventing pollution) [hereinafter cited as Long Range Convention]; U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1972), endorsed, G.A. Res. 2996, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42; Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T.
2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 (establishment of international prohibitions on dis-
charge of oil by vessels on the high seas).
8 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act, June 26, 1970, 28th Parliament, 2d Sess., 18-19 Elizabeth II (Canada), re-
printed in 3 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 988 (1975); Federal Law for
the Prevention and Control of Contamination of the Environment, Mexican Anti-Contami-
nation Law, D.O., Mar. 23, 1971 (Mexico). Section 7415 of the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977 provide for abatement of trananational pollution if three conditions are present- (1)
the pollution is reasonably anticipated to endanger interests in a foreign country, (2) the
Secretary of State of the United States receives notification and a request for abatement
from a foreign government agency, and (3) the victim nation affords the United States es-
sentially the same rights. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1982). The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act, which enabled Canada to exercise jurisdiction well into the Arctic Ocean, was opposed
by the United States on the ground that the legislation was a unilateral act and, thus, insuf-
ficient to deal with an essentially international problem. See Neuman, Oil on Troubled Wa-
ters: The International Control of Marine Pollution, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 349, 355-56
(1971). Although the exercise of sovereignty over such a large portion of the ocean appar-
ently was in violation of international law, public opinion in both countries seemed to favor
the measure as a means of preserving the "fragile Arctic environment." Id.
9 See, e.g., Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1206
(D.N.J. 1978) (New Jersey township sued New York City for injunctive relief and damages
for pollution of the Hudson River); Oakwood Homeowners' Ass'n v. Marathon Oil Co., 104
Mich. App. 689, 691-92, 305 N.W.2d 567, 568-69 (1981) (action for declaratory judgment and
injunction under Michigan Environmental Protection Act and for compensatory damages
for air pollution injury under theory of common-law private nuisance). The Federal Water
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means of compensating private parties injured by transnational
pollution.
When transnational pollution injures a foreign nation, the sov-
ereign may follow several diplomatic and international channels to
obtain compensatory damages.10 Existing remedies for private
plaintiffs injured by transnational pollution, however, are pro-
tracted and expensive endeavors"" that are ultimately dependent
on sovereign cooperation. 12 Often, the affirmative defense of sover-
eign immunity precludes the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resi-
dent polluters.1 3 Even when jurisdiction is acquired, neither do-
mestic nor international forums possess sufficient mechanisms by
which to enforce judicial and arbitral decisions extranationally, ab-
sent consonant rules of comity and good-faith cooperation between
Pollution Control Act provides for criminal penalties for certain polluting activities. 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982). The penalties are relatively severe: for first offenders, a fine of
not less than $2,500 per day of violation nor more than $25,000 per day and/or imprison-
ment for not more than 1 year; for second offenders, a fine of not more than $50,000 per day
of violation, and/or imprisonment for not more than 2 years. Id. The statute also provides
for the issuance of an abatement order by the EPA Administrator. See United States v.
Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1183 (D. Ariz. 1975). Despite its purpose as a deter-
rent, the penalty is a civil one and is collected through traditional civil procedures. See
Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
10 See Teclaff, supra note 4, at 542. A claim is considered an international one if activ-
ity attributable to one sovereign causes cognizable damage to another. See Hoffman, supra
note 6, at 516. The dispute may be resolved by either arbitration or negotiation, see Bil-
lingsley, supra note 4, at 347-49, or the injured sovereign may attempt to litigate the claim
in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), see Note, Ixtoc I: International and Domestic
Remedies for Transboundary Pollution Injury, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 404, 413-19 (1980); in-
fra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
' See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 345. Unfamiliarity with foreign law and legal prac-
tice increases the cost of foreign litigation. See id. In addition to the costs of discovery,
service of process, transportation, and lodging, a plaintiff in an alien forum may be forced to
hire foreign counsel, interpreters, and translators. See id. at 344-46. For a discussion of the
problems involved in suing in a foreign jurisdiction, see F. DAwsON & L HEAD, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, NATIONAL TRmUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 35-47 (1971).
12 See Boczek, International Protection of the Baltic Sea Environment Against Pollu-
tion: A Study in Marine Regionalism, 72 AM. J. Irr'L L. 782, 810 (1978); Rosencranz, The
International Law and Politics of Acid Rain, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 511, 517 (1981).
Unless domestic law incorporates the substance of an international rule of law, there is no
mechanism by which to enforce the international rule. Id.; see infra note 89 and accompany-
ing text.
"' See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825); Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812) (adopting doctrine of absolute sovereign im-
munity). Recently, a United States district court dismissed a suit for damages caused by
transnational pollution brought by American citizens against a corporate agency of the Mex-
ican Government on the ground that sovereign immunity was a complete defense. See In re
Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D. Tex. 1982); infra notes 82-83 and accompanying
text.
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the disputants. 14 Moreover, although mere pecuniary compensation
is manifestly inadequate to redress every injury caused by pollu-
tants,15 the procedural complexities of international law virtually
preclude an alien from obtaining enforceable injunctive relief from
activity that takes place wholly within the jurisdiction of a foreign
nation.16
Since virtually all major transnational pollution disputes in-
volving the United States also involve its two contiguous neigh-
bors, Mexico and Canada, this Note will focus on the legal rela-
tionship of the United States with these two states." After
14 See, e.g., Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental
Protection, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 179, 188 (1973) (enforcement provision of international
environmental convention has limited capacity to affect loss distribution and prevention
policies); Rosencranz, supra note 12, at 512. Rosencranz asserts that "[n]ations control pol-
lution only if and when it is in their... interest to do so, and not because of any obligation
under international law to do so." Id. Another commentator states:
[e]ven where relief is possible under the conflicts law of the forum in which the
suit is brought, that may not be enough where attempted enforcement of a judg-
ment by a court in the victim State 'could amount to an invasion of the sover-
eignty of a foreign State and which, in any case, a judge of a national supreme
court or an international court would not be compelled to heed.'
Hoffman, supra note 6, at 512-13 n.19 (quoting Rest, Transfrontier Environmental Dam-
ages: Judicial Competence and the Forum Delicti Commissi, 1 ENV'T POL. & L. 127, 127
(1975)).
In order to enforce a judgment rendered in a foreign court, there must be a basis for the
judgment in the law of the enforcing state. Billingsley, supra note 4, at 344. A nation may be
induced, however, to enforce foreign judgments because of self interest. See Comment,
supra note 4, at 657 n.96. Indeed, a nation that refuses to enforce a duly rendered foreign
judgment risks both similar treatment of its own judgments, and the imposition of economic
or diplomatic sanctions. Id.
15 See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938), reprinted in
35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684, 694 (1941) (air pollutants destroyed the quality of soil in agricultural
area to such an extent that farming was no longer possible); see also Applegate, Trans-
boundary Air Quality: Problems and Prospects from El Paso to Brownsville, 22 NAT. RE-
souaCs J. 1133, 1135 (1982). The levels of lead in the blood of children who reside along
the Mexico-United States border are unacceptable by federal standards, and safe drinking
water is scarce as a result of pollution from border industries. Applegate, supra, at 1135.
The situation in the Great Lakes is nearly as grim. See McCaffrey, Trans-Boundary Pollu-
tion Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in Private Litigation Between Canada and the
United States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 191, 197 (1973).
16 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 512 n.19; McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 195. Relief for
victims of transnational pollution is circumscribed by international respect for sovereign
rights. McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 195. Even when there is proper jurisdiction to grant
equitable relief, courts have declined to issue an injunction if the possibility of "discord and
conflict" with another nation exists. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
'7 Although the relationship between the United States and Canada traditionally has
been cooperative and friendly, see Holsti & Levi, Bilateral Institutions and Transgovern-
mental Relations Between Canada and the United States, in CANADA AND THE UNrrED
TRANSNATIONAL POLLUTION
discussing the merits of existing remedies for transnational pollu-
tion injury, this Note will propose a solution that provides for in-
creased availability of private redress irrespective of the national-
ity of the victim or the country from which the pollutants emanate.
The Note will conclude that bilateral pollution treaties, with com-
prehensive provisions for the creation of private avenues of re-
dress, are essential to the establishment of and implementation of
private remedies for transnational pollution.
EXISTING REMEDIES
Private Civil Claims
Section 1350 of title 28 of the United States Code permits
non-resident aliens to sue within the United States for extrana-
tionally effective torts committed within American boundaries. '8
Foreign nationals injured by pollution also may bring an action
based on state tort law in federal court pursuant to the court's di-
versity jurisdiction.19 The courts of Canada and Mexico, however,
are not as accessible to United States nationals seeking compensa-
tion for the same type of injury.
STATES: TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 283, 306 (1976), relations re-
cently have been strained by a growing sentiment in Canada that the United States refuses
to accept its deserved responsibility for acid rain, see Comment, supra note 4, at 655-56.
Presently, the United States is denying, or at least postponing, liability for acid rain damage
to Canadian property and industries. See Otten, Can EPA Be Made Rational?, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 19, 1983, at 30, col. 4; see also Note, International-United States Air Pollution Control
and the Acid Rain Phenomenon, 21 NAT. REsouRCEs J. 631, 631-32, 636 (1981) (discussion
of international controversy caused by acid rain and its possible connection with sulfur
emissions). On the southern border of the United States, different legal and social tradi-
tions, and scarce resources have resulted in a long history of ambivalent relations between
the two adjacent sovereigns. See, e.g., 3 M. WHTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 962-
64 (1964); Brownell & Eaton, The Colorado River Salinity Problem with Mexico, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 255, 256 (1975). Indeed, the Harmon Doctrine-a sovereign has an absolute right to
take action within its borders-was first asserted in a controversy between the United
States and Mexico. See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 206.
Is 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). To be actionable under § 1350, tortious activity must violate
either "the law of nations" or "a treaty of the United States." Id; see Abdul-Rahman Omar
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961). Section 1350, however, is narrowly con-
strued and "rarely used." See UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (only
two cases have sustained jurisdiction under § 1350).
19 See Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div. Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1975). In Michie, Canadian domiciliaries sought compen-
satory and punitive damages for personal injuries and injuries to property caused by water
pollution originating at the defendant's American factories. Id. at 215. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the defendants could be held
jointly and severally liable in a transnational pollution suit. Id.
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Canadian courts are bound by the "rule of local action," which
forces provincial courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over con-
troversies involving injury to real property outside the boundaries
of a forum province.20 Therefore, an action initiated in Canada for
damage to real property situated in the United States and caused
by pollution generated within Canada is likely to be dismissed on
the ground that such cases must be tried in a forum in which the
land is located. An action filed in a United States district court by
an American national against a Canadian polluter may be similarly
handicapped, since a United States court cannot exercise jurisdic-
tion over a defendant that does not have minimum contacts within
the forum state.2 1 Even if a federal court decides to exercise long-
arm jurisdiction over a foreign polluter,22 the enforceability of a
10 Albert v. Fraser Cos., [1937] 1 D.L.R. 39; Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber Co., [1925]
1 D.L.R. 978. The court in Fraser derived the modem "local action rule" from the English
common-law rule espoused in British South Africa Co. v. Compania de Mocambique, 1893
A.C. 602, reprinted in [1891-1894] All E.R. 640. In British South Africa, the court held that
English courts may not exercise jurisdiction over a dispute concerning title to foreign real
property or in an action alleging trespass on foreign land. British South Africa, 1893 A.C. at
609, reprinted in [1891-1894] All E.R. at 647-48. At the time British South Africa was de-
cided, jurors were required to have personal knowledge of the facts. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 87 comment a (1971). Therefore, all cases had to be litigated in
the forum in which the event in question took place. See id. Although jurors are forbidden
to have personal knowledge of the facts, the rule is still applied to bar suits. See id.
Although no Canadian province is bound by the case law of another, see McWhinney,
Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in Canada, in CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE: THE CIVIL
LAW AND COMMON LAW IN CANADA 19 (E. McWhinney ed. 1958), the rule of local action is
followed uniformly throughout Canada, see J. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLCT OF LAWS 345
(1975); McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 227.
11 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The specific
requirements that must be met before long-arm jurisdiction can be acquired over a foreign
party in a diversity action are determined by the law of the state in which the action is
instituted. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 1963); see Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 lL 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The
Gray court stated that the minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe may be
satisfied by establishing the foreseeability of a given effect in the forum state. See 22 I. 2d
at 437, 176 N.E.2d at 766; Fischer, supra note 1, at 59. One commentator has remarked-
"The interstate polluter who places pollutants in the jetstream, so to speak, should be
treated no differently than the manufacturer who places a product in the stream of com-
merce." Fischer, supra note 1, at 59. Since the effects of pollution are foreseeable, the Gray
decision supports the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign polluter engaging in activity that
is reasonably likely to affect the victim state. See Arbitblit, The Plight of American Citi-
zens Injured by Transboundary River Pollution, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 346 (1979).
"I See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 495 (1971). In Wyandotte, the
State of Ohio sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in an action for
abatement of a nuisance against two Michigan corporations and a Canadian corporation
doing business in Ontario. Id. at 494. Ohio alleged that the corporations contaminated Lake
Erie by dumping mercury into tributaries of the lake. Id. Although the majority declined to
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United States judgment against a Canadian domiciliary in a trans-
national pollution action is questionable.23 Under the Canadian
principle of reciprocity, foreign judgments are enforced only if Ca-
nadian courts would have exercised jurisdiction over a foreign de-
fendant in a parallel situation.2 4 In tort actions based on negli-
gence, however, Canadian courts will exercise jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants only if the tortious act took place within
the court's jurisdiction.25 Thus, the "local action rule" and the
principle of reciprocity present serious impediments to private re-
dress for victims of transboundary pollution.
entertain the action on prudential grounds, the Court acknowledged its capacity to exercise
jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at 500-01.
Is See Arbitblit, supra note 21, at 347; McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 252-57. Canadian
provinces require that the validity of a foreign judgment be established by the standards of
the enforcing court. See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 257 n.342. Ontario, for example, re-
fuses to enforce a foreign judgment issued by a court in a forum with which an Ontario
resident has no commercial nexus. See McIntyre Porcupine Mines, Ltd. v. Hammond, 119
D.L.R.3d 139, 146-47 (1975). Two Canadian provinces do not acknowledge personal jurisdic-
tion established by extraterritorial service of process, see McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 256,
and others allow any foreign judgment to be reopened on the merits, see id.
"' See Arbitblit, supra note 21, at 345-46. The enforcing court evaluates the propriety
of the original court's jurisdiction in terms of its own conflict of laws rules. J. CASTEL, INTRO-
DUCTION TO CoNFLiCT Or LAws 80 (1978). Therefore, a foreign court's exercise of jurisdiction
does not bind the enforcing court. See Frederick A. Jones, Inc. v. Toronto General Ins. Co.,
[1933] D.L.R. 660, 663-64; see J. CASTEL, supra, at 80. The Canadian court examines
whether the foreign judgment was issued by a court exercising valid in personam interna-
tional jurisdiction. The determination is based on the following factors:
(1) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judg-
ment was obtained;
(2) Where the defendant at the time of the commencement of the proceedings
was physically present in or a resident of or domiciled in, the foreign country in
which the judgment was obtained;
(3) Where the litigant voluntarily had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court of the foreign country in which the judgment was obtained:
(a) Where the defendant as a plaintiff or counterclaimant had se-
lected the foreign court,
(b) Where the defendant voluntarily had appeared,
(c) Where the defendant had contracted to submit himself to the
forum in which the judgment was obtained.
J. CASTEL, supra note 20, at 426.
Judgments of United States courts rendered against Canadian polluters who do not
meet these criteria will not be enforced even though the exercise of jurisdiction was proper
under the laws of the original court. See J. CASTEL, supra, at 80.
15 See Arbitblit, supra note 21, at 346. The phrase "tort committed within the jurisdic-
tion" is construed narrowly by Canadian courts to exclude the place of the injury as a basis
for jurisdiction if it differs from the place in which the tortious act was committed. See id.;
J. CASTEL, supra note 20, at 253. One Canadian jurist, however, has expressed the view that
a rule of foreseeable impact should govern in an action for tort damages. Moran v. Pyle
Nat'l, Ltd., 43 D.L.R.3d 239, 290 (1974); see J. CASTEL, supra note 20, at 258-59.
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American plaintiffs attempting to obtain redress in Mexican
courts for injuries caused by transnational pollution originating in
Mexico are likely to encounter similar obstacles.28 Under Mexican
law, the only court that can exercise jurisdiction over claims in-
volving real estate is a court sitting in the state in which the land
is located. In addition, Mexico's relationship with the United
States reflects a politically charged environment that could affect
the course of transnational pollution litigation.28 If an action is
brought by an American national in a United States court, it is
questionable whether the resulting judgment will be enforceable in
Mexico. 29 Moreover, since many of Mexico's major industries are
nationalized, the defense of sovereign immunity often will prove to
be an absolute bar to suits against such industries.30
In an attempt to facilitate private actions against certain for-
eign entities, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) in 1976."1 Pursuant to the FSIA, the federal district
26 Although the Mexican Constitution establishes a federal republic, Mexico has a very
strong central government with power concentrated in the executive branch. See Bath, U.S.-
Mexico Experience in Managing Transboundary Air Resources: Problems, Prospects, and
Recommendations for the Future, 22 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 1147, 1156 (1982). The Mexican
judiciary has limited independence and is subject to political pressure. See J. HERGEr & J.
CAsm, supra note 5, at 78-79. More significantly, as long as a company receives the govern-
ment's approval for a manufacturing process or machine, any resultant pollution is not
actionable.
17 See J. HERGET & J. CAsm, supra note 5, at 73.
" See, e.g., In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (Mexico refused to
acknowledge liability for damage to United States interests caused by oil well blowout in
Gulf of Mexico tributary); Margain, Respect in Friendship, 12 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 455,
455 (1980) (strained relations between United States and Mexico); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1979, at A5, col. 1 (Mexican President toasted President Carter by noting "an atmosphere of
mistrust or open hostility" that must be ameliorated); supra note 17.
29 See COMPENDIUM OF THE LAws OF MExico art. 776 (Wheless 1938). Foreign judg-
ments, or ejecutorias, presented for enforcement in Mexico will not be enforced absent com-
pliance with strict procedural requirements:
(1) they must comply with formalities for submission to the appropriate Mex-
ican district judge;
(2) they must have been rendered at the conclusion of an in personam action;
(3) the event upon which the suit was based must have been actionable in
Mexico;
(4) the defendant must have been personally served;
(5) they must be enforceable in the country of the original court; and
(6) they must be authenticated.
Id. Only a judge who could have heard the suit if it were brought in Mexico is competent to
enforce a foreign judgment. Id.
30 See In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566-67 (S.D. Tex. 1982); J. HERGEr & J.
CAam, supra note 5, at 72.
31 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1982); see Martropico Compania Naviera
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courts are empowered to exercise personal jurisdiction over a for-
eign sovereign that has caused a direct injury in the United States
as a result of commercial activity.32 Long-arm jurisdiction will at-
tach only if the injury is proximately caused by an agency of a
foreign government acting in a non-governmental capacity."5 The
narrow interpretation that the FSIA has received, however, se-
verely limits its utility in transnational pollution suits.3 Thus, ju-
risdictional hurdles, difficulties with extranational enforcement of
judgments, and the problem of sovereign immunity make private
actions in the domestic courts of the three countries too uncertain
a means of compensation for victims of transnational pollution
injury.
State-to-State Claims
Any nation may bring suit in the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) for injuries caused by pollution generated in a foreign
nation;35 however, no claims have yet been initiated. Because rights
S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina), 428 F. Supp.
1035, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum); Note, Sovereign Immunity Limits of Judicial Con-
trol-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 429, 430-32
(1977).
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). Section 1605 of the United States Code qualifies
the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity by allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over claims against a sovereign involving a waiver of immunity, commercial activity
carried on within the United States, or outside the United States if the activity causes a
direct effect within the United States, expropriation, rights in gifts or bequests of immova-
ble property, non-commercial torts, and specific maritime liens. Id. § 1605. For an extensive
discussion of the gradual circumscription of absolute sovereign immunity and its present
application to transnational pollution disputes, see Note, supra note 10, at 419-30; Note,
supra note 31, at 440-43.
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6615. The legislative history of the
FSIA indicates that "a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state
would include not only a commercial transaction performed and executed in its entirety in
the United States, but also a commercial transaction or act having a 'substantial contact'
with the United States." Id.
See In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (foreign oil drilling
activities of government agency held protected by sovereign immunity).
3" See LC.J. CHARTER art. 36; Note, supra note 10, at 413-15. The subject matter juris-
diction of the ICJ over pollution claims has never been tested, and there is some indication
that it never will be. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 531, 536. For example, when Mexico and
the United States were unable to reach agreement on sovereign responsibility for high saline
levels in the Colorado River, the nations refrained from submitting the dispute to the ICJ
for fear of unpredictable results. See Note, The International Joint Commission (U.S.-
Can.) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (U.S.-Mex.): Potential for
Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTL' L. & POL. 499, 516 (1973).
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and duties arising under accepted principles of international law
inure only to nations,36 suits in the ICJ must be commenced by a
sovereign on behalf of itself or its nationals,3 7 and the activity of a
tortfeasor must be imputable to the nation in which the tortfeasor
is domiciled.38 Thus, for an international action to lie, any wrong-
ful act that impacts extranationally on a non-resident alien must
be elevated to the status of an international tort.3 A nation must
consider other national interests such as the encouragement of in-
dustry and trade,4 0 the threat of reciprocal suits, 41 and the mainte-
nance of cordial diplomatic relations 42 before appealing to the ICJ.
Such considerations often outweigh the nation's interest in com-
pensating its citizens.43
One commentator, however, suggests that a transboundary pollution suit in the ICJ would
fail for lack of substantial state interest in the claim. See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 346-
47.
so See Kunz, Supra-National Organs, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 690, 695 (1952).
37 See I.C.J. CHARTER art. 34, para. 1; Note, supra note 10, at 414. It has been suggested
that acceptance of "environmental protection as a human right compels acknowledgement
of the individual as a procedural subject of international law." Mingst, Evaluating Public
and Private Approaches to International Solutions to Acid Rain Pollution, 22 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 5, 14 (1982).
1 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 541. See generally Koessler, Government Espousal of
Private Claims Before International Tribunals, 13 U. Cm. L. REv. 180, 180-84 (1946).
8 8 M. WHrrMsMAN, supra note 17, at 1216; see supra note 37.
40 See, e.g., Inman, A View of Mexican-U.S. Trade, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 190, 192-94
(1981) (Mexico-United States interdependence on trade of oil and manufactured goods).
Because the vast majority of maquiladoras are located on the United States border, see
supra note 5, it is unlikely that Mexico would seek to litigate an injured national's trans-
boundary pollution claim in an international forum against the United States. See Legal
Implications, supra note 5, at 576.
41 The United States has been reluctant to accept financial responsibility for extrana-
tional effects of domestic pollution. See, e.g., Martin, Ottawa Scorns U.S. Policy on Acid
Rain, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1984, at A3, col. 3; Note, supra note 35, at 516 (refusal of United
States to compensate Mexico for damages caused by saline water). Of course, a sovereign's
recognition that the roles of tortfeasor and victim may be reversed could encourage it to
press for a pattern of reciprocal remedies with its neighbors. See Comment, supra note 4, at
654-55.
41 See Mingst, supra note 37, at 20. Treating the causes of private injuries as interna-
tional tortious acts may not be in the best interests of diplomacy and may even retard the
progress of international environmental cooperation. See id.; McCaffrey, supra note 15, at
191. For example, Canadian-American relations traditionally have been friendly. See supra
note 17. To submit a transnational pollution dispute to an unrepresentative international
court or tribunal would be an unfriendly act and would make little sense in light of past
diplomatic relations. See, e.g., Holsti & Levy, supra note 17, at 306; Comment, supra note 4,
at 655; Comment, Pollution of the Great Lakes: A Joint Approach by Canada and the
United States, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 109, 113 (1971).
41 See Koessler, supra note 38, at 182; cf. Chester, Remedies in Canadian Courts, 5
CAN.-U.S.L.J. 85, 87 (1982) (private litigation advocated as means to avoid unenthusiastic
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In order to initiate a transnational pollution action in the ICJ,
a nation must prove that the local remedies of the offending nation
have been exhausted by the aggrieved party or parties.4" If a for-
eign court declines jurisdiction over a suit filed by a non-resident
alien, the claim must be pursued to that nation's highest court
before the government of the victim may invoke the adjudicative
powers of the ICJ. 5 Appealing the dismissal of a claim from the
trial court to the highest court of any nation requires a substantial
expenditure of time and money, which may render pursuit of a
claim impractical. 46 The difficulty of litigating transnational pollu-
tion claims in the ICJ is compounded further by jurisdictional pre-
requisites which mandate that, absent a treaty provision, a defen-
dant sovereign must consent to the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by the court.47
Although the United States, Canada, and Mexico have submit-
ted jurisdictional declarations,48 each has included reservations
that limit the actual exercise of jurisdiction. 9 Each reservation is
government response to a potential claim); Mingst, supra note 37, at 16 (advantage of pri-
vate litigation is absence of interjection of national interests that often prevents espousal of
a claim).
" See Bleicher, An Overview of International Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25 (1972);
Mummery, The Content of the Duty to Exhaust Local Judicial Remedies, 58 Am. J. INT'L
L. 389, 398 (1964); Note, supra note 10, at 414 n.55. The United Nations Charter has been
construed to mandate that disputants pursue other methods of settlement, such as domestic
administrative remedies, before filing suit in the International Court of Justice. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 33, para. 1; Note, supra note 10, at 413, n.52.
45 See Note, supra note 10, at 414 & n.55.
46 The Impact of the Blowout of the Mexican Oil Well Ixtoc I and the Resultant Oil
Pollution in Texas and the Gulf of Mexico: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 263 (1979) (statement of
Gunther Hand); see also Billingsley, supra note 4, at 347 (ICJ claims can take many years
to litigate).
", See LC.J. CHAnTER art. 36; Owen, Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice: A Study of its Acceptance by Nations, 3 GA. L. REv. 704, 705 (1969);
Note, supra note 10, at 416-17. Nations may consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ by nego-
tiating a treaty in which the parties agree to submit to the court any disputes arising under
the terms of the treaty. See id.
"1 1978-1979 LC.J.Y.B. 55-85 (1979); Note, supra note 10, at 417.
" See BAsic DocuMENTs OF INTENAoTONAL RELATIONS 221 (F. Hartmenn ed. 1951);
Note, supra note 10, at 417-18. Contentious jurisdiction is the term used to denote the juris-
diction obtained by the ICJ when a plaintiff nation submits a claim under a jurisdictional
declaration and a defendant nation consents to ICJ adjudication of the dispute. See Owen,
supra note 47, at 709-10; Note, supra note 10, at 415 & n.56. Reservations are clauses in-
serted in jurisdictional declarations of submission under article 36, paragraph 2 of the ICJ
Charter, that create exceptions to blanket jurisdictional acquiescence. See Owen, supra note
47, at 710; Note, supra note 10, at 418 & n.67. Reservations on file include, but are not
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operative reciprocally and, therefore, can be used by a defendant
nation exclusive of its own reservations as a complete defense to
alleged jurisdictionYe Because the American reservation essentially
allows the United States to consent to jurisdiction on a case-by-
case basis, any nation it wishes to bring before the ICJ may do the
same.51 Even if the ICJ obtains jurisdiction over the parties and
renders a decision, no effective mechanism exists by which to en-
force the judgment.52 Thus, a successful suit in the ICJ may
amount to little more than a moral victory absent good-faith com-
pliance by the defendant."
International Agreements
International agreements, it is suggested, are the most effec-
tive and efficient means of regulating, the environment and re-
dressing environmental injury.54 Existing international agreements,
limited to: disputes for which the parties have provided other means of resolution, disputes
that arise after the declarations' expiration date (when an expiration date is included), and
disputes arising before the declaration becomes effective. Owen, supra note 47, at 710; Note,
supra note 10, at 418 n.67.
50 See, e.g., Norwegian Loans, 1957 I.C.J. 6, 23; Note, supra note 10, at 418. Because
reservations are reciprocally effective, "the defendant nation need defend only to the extent
that its declaration overlaps or coincides with the plaintiff nation." Note, supra note 10, at
418 (footnote omitted).
51 See Note, supra note 10, at 418-19. The American reservation, known as the Con-
nolly Amendment, provides that the consent to jurisdiction:
shall not apply to (a) disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to
other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be con-
cluded in the future; or (b) disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by
the United States of America; or (c) disputes arising under a multilateral treaty,
unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the
case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to
jurisdiction.
61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598 (1947).
82 Only 60 cases have been decided by the ICJ since its inception in 1945. See Note,
supra note 10, at 417 n.64; 1946-1947 I.C.J.Y.B. 15 (1947). Although 59 decisions did not
involve any enforcement problems, see Note, supra note 10, at 416 & n.59, the court is
powerless to implement its decisions forcibly, see, e.g., Corfu Channel Case (Gr. Brit. v.
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 26; S. RosENa, THE WORLD Couir 40 (3d ed. 1973).
See Note, supra note 10, at 416 n.59.
There is little question that the degeneration of the environment poses problems
severe enough to require implementation of international agreements for their abrogation.
See, e.g., Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. GAOR U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 (32d
Sess. of the International Law Commission (1980)) (agreement to protect foreign nations
from injury caused by activity within another nation) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Re-
port]). However, while public awareness of the odious economic and social impact of envi-
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however, impose broad and ill-defined duties on party nations, and
do not contain adequate sanctions for their violation." Further,
global conventions under the auspices of the United Nations fail to
incorporate affirmative obligations to prevent pollution or to rec-
ompense those injured transnationaly.56
ronmental deterioration is at an historical peak, see Kalo, Water Pollution and Commercial
Fishermen: Applying General Maritime Law to Claims for Damages to Fisheries in Ocean
and Coastal Waters, 61 N.C.L. REv. 313, 313 (1983), state and municipal pollution control
regimes generally have been unsuccessful, see J. DAvIEs & B. DAvIEs, supra note 3, at 220.
Consequently, responsibility for regulation has expanded to progressively higher levels of
government. Id. at 169. The tendency to centralize environmental regulatory authority
should result in the yielding of national control to an international body. Id. at 221. To limit
preventive and rehabilitative approaches to pollution to the national level, however, is to
ignore the international nature of the problem. Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A
Study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation, 70 MicH. L. REv. 469, 548
(1972); see supra note 4. To some extent, the United States has recognized the need for a
correlation between internationally concerted action and international problems by negoti-
ating agreements with Canada and Mexico that provide, in part, for the monitoring of bor-
der pollution. See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-
Canada, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as 1909 Treaty]; Treaty on Utilization
of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, United
States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter cited as 1944 Treaty]; Memorandum
of Intent Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, Aug. 5, 1980, United States-Canada, -
U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. No. 9856, reprinted in EvmomwoaL LAw SEcTION, CANAVLAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDING ComrITTE ON ENvIRoNMENTAL LAw, AmucAN BAR AsSOCIATION,
COMMON BOUNDARY/CoMMoN PROBLEMS: Tim ENvRoNmENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY
PRODUCTION 113-24 (1982).
"See Teclaff & Teclaff, Transboundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends
in Treaty Law, 19 NAT. REsou CEs J. 629, 660 (1979). Although it has been suggested that
international environmental law may be evolving to a point where responsibility may attach
to nations for "failure to control a source of harm to the nationals of other States," see
Brownlie, supra note 14, at 180, existing agreements do not provide for the distribution of
losses caused by the failure of a nation responsibly to control the polluting activities of its
nationals, see id. at 188. Instead, the drafters of international agreements include expansive
suggestions rather than specific duties. See Comment, supra note 4, at 662-63. The resultant
ambiguities inevitably lead to disputes. Charney, United States Interests in a Convention
on the Law of the Sea: The Case for Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRNSNAT'L L. 39, 43
(1978). The dispute settlement mechanisms in international agreements often are criticized
for the absence of measures with which to effect compliance. See Teclaff, supra note 4, at
561; Comment, Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Draft Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331, 352 (1981). Clearly, even if an obligation existed and
was submitted for adjudication, many situations can arise in which nations "would disregard
the final judgment if it were sufficiently contrary to their national interests." Id. at 353; see
infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
"See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 350-51. For example, principle 21 of the Declaration
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.48/14 & Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 LL.M. 1416 (1972), endorsed, G.A. Res. 2996, 27
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, provides:
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Most regional treaties that directly address the international
ramifications of pollution are limited, by their terms or in practice,
to agreements concerning the exchange of information and re-
search activities.57 For example, in 1909, the United States and
Great Britain entered into a treaty relating to boundary waters be-
tween the United States and Canada."' The treaty, still in force
today, established the International Joint Commission (the Joint
Commission or the Commission) which was endowed with advi-
sory, investigative, and arbitral authority.59 Either the United
States or Canada may invoke such authority by referring a ques-
tion to the Joint Commission. 0 Commentators regard the treaty
and the Joint Commission as capable of embracing all manner of
issues involving the shared boundaries of the two nations;," indeed,
States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id. principle 21. However, the corresponding implementing principle mandates only that
nations cooperate to develop laws regarding liability and compensation. Id. principle 22.
The foregoing is just one illustration of the disparity between the imposition of responsibil-
ity and effective enforcement mechanisms. See Teclaff, supra note 4, at 561.
11 See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979,
U.N. Doc. E/ECE/1010 ("[t]he Contracting Parties shall exchange information on and re-
view their policies, scientific activities and technical measures ... aimed at the discharge of
air pollutants"); Minute No. 261 of the International Boundary and Water Commission,
Sept. 24, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 509, T.I.A.S. No. 9658 (agreement providing for exchange of infor-
mation and research on non-industrial pollution).
" 1909 Treaty, supra note 54.
19 Id. arts. VIII-X; see Note, supra note 1, at 229; Note, supra note 35, at 503, 523.
11 See 1909 Treaty, supra note 54, art. 9. Typically, references of questions to the Joint
Commission for factual investigation have been made jointly under article 9, see Roberts,
Introductory Remarks, 5 CAN.-U.S.L.J. 2, 4 (1982), although the terms of that article re-
quire that only one nation make the request, see 1909 Treaty, supra note 54, art 9. Article
10 of the treaty, which empowers the Joint Commission to arbitrate jointly referred dis-
putes, has never been invoked. See Bilder, supra note 54, at 555. Counsel for the United
States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) asserts that
neither the Joint Commission nor the IBWC has the power to settle disputes. See Com-
ment, Effluent Neighbors: The Mexico-United States Water Quality Dilemma, 3 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 152, 165 n.79 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Effluent Neighbors]. Even if Article 10
were invoked, the Commission's dispute settlement authority depends on the good faith of
the parties for enforcement of its decisions. See Comment, supra note 42, at 124.
61 See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938), reprinted in
35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941); Hoffman, supra note 6, at 521. Although the terms of the
treaty provide for expansive powers, the Joint Commission's role in pollution disputes has
been limited to "developing government and public awareness .... providing scientific and
technical information ... suggesting the nature of the remedies required, and furnishing a
means through which national programs can be better coordinated." Bilder, supra note 54,
at 555.
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the treaty is considered the forerunner of international pollution
control agreements. 2 Although the treaty imposes on the parties a
duty to prevent pollution of boundary waters,63 the resolution of
disputes between private parties resulting from breaches of this
duty is not its primary objective." While the agreement has been
used to create advisory boards that monitor pollution levels and
polluting activity,65 it establishes no mechanism for the satisfaction
of private claims.66
The inadequacy of the Joint Commission's dispute settlement
capacity was demonstrated in the controversy surrounding a large
copper smelter in Trail, British Columbia.6 The smelter, over a
period of more than 30 years, emitted massive amounts of sulfur
into the atmosphere, substantially damaging agricultural property
in the State of Washington.68 After private efforts to settle the con-
troversy failed, the two nations submitted the matter to the Joint
Commission for a factual investigation. 9 When the investigation
62 See English, Hazardous Waste Regulation: A Prescription for Clean Water, 13 SE-
TON HALL L. REv. 229, 243 (1983).
'3 See 1909 Treaty, supra note 54, art. IV. Article 4 provides, in part- "the waters
herein defined as boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be pol-
luted on either side to the injury of health or property of the other." Id.
The purpose of the 1909 Treaty is to "prevent disputes regarding the use of bound-
ary waters and to settle all questions.. . between the United States and the Dominion of
Canada involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to
the inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier." 1909 Treaty, supra note 54,
preamble. The first study of pollution conducted by the Joint Commission resulted in a
recommendation that the Commission's powers be expanded to include regulatory authority
to prohibit pollution in boundary waters. Bilder, supra note 54, at 489-90. The recommen-
dations were never implemented. See Note, supra note 1, at 217.
"' See Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Apr. 15, 1972, United States-Canada,
23 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. No. 7312. Article 7 of the 1972 Great Lakes Agreement allowed the
Joint Commission to create and supervise the Great Lakes Water Quality Board and the
Research Advisory Board. See id. art. VII. The objective of the boards is to monitor compli-
ance with the 1972 Great Lakes Agreement. See id. The duties of the boards have been
expanded to include the investigation of basin-wide pollution regardless of the source or the
medium by which it is transported. See Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22,
1978, United States-Canada, art. VII, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
66 See Comment, supra note 42, at 117. One commentator notes: "With all of its useful-
ness, the IJC [Joint Commission], as it stands today, can neither codify nor enforce pollu-
tion control regulations in the Great Lakes." Id. Indeed, neither the United States nor Ca-
nada has sought to invoke the article 4 prohibition against the other. See Bilder, supra note
54, at 555.
67 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938), reprinted in 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). For an
exhaustive analysis of the Trail Smelter case, see Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 215-29 (1963).
See 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1911, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at 692-95.
6 See Arbitblit, supra note 21, at 361.
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was completed, the United States refused to adopt the report is-
sued by the Commission."0 Additional negotiations were initiated
and an ad hoc tribunal was established to mediate the dispute.7 1
Thirteen years passed, however, before the victims received any
compensation for their injuries. 2
Mexico and the United States established a bilateral commis-
sion with original jurisdiction over certain boundary disputes by
convention in 1889.7s The responsibilities of the International
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) were later expanded to
include "the regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations"
and "the settlement of all disputes" arising under the treaty.7 4
Traditionally, IBWC activity had been limited to the delineation
of boundaries and the management of scarce water resources in the
boundary area.7 5 In recent years, the IBWC has expanded its role
70 See Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1914, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. at
694. Canada eventually paid the United States $350,000 as compensation for the injuries
caused by the smelter from 1925 "up to and including the first day of January, 1932"--the
amount of damages determined by the Joint Commission. See id.
71 See id. at 1907, 35 AM J. IrT'L L. at 684. A state-to-state claim was created from the
private dispute between the farmers in Washington and the smelter owners in British Co-
lumbia by "transmuting" both the injury and the offending behavior of the private parties
to their respective governments. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 512. The term implies a
waiver "by Canada of some of the procedural rules of State responsibility." Id. The effect of
transmuting the claim in Trail Smelter was to avoid testing the true scope of state responsi-
bility. Id. The outcome of the dispute may have been quite different if Canada had not
conceded the issue of liability and had defended against the claim, see id., since the govern-
ment of Canada was not a tortfeasor with respect to the Washington farmers, see Read,
supra note 67, at 227. Therefore, if Canada refused to acquiesce in the United States' claim,
the former nation could be held liable only if the tribunal determined that an international
tort had been committed. See id. However, Canada agreed to submit the dispute to the
tribunal solely for determination of damages. See Arbitblit, supra note 21, at 362. Thus, the
arbitration was not a true test of intergovernmental responsibility for transnational pollu-
tion injury. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 512.
72 See Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1907, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. at
694; Read, supra note 67, at 213. Trail Smelter typifies the "circuitous and burdensome"
nature of state-to-state claims. See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 512.
73 Convention to Facilitate the Carrying Out of Treaty of 1884, Mar. 1, 1889, United
States-Mexico, art. I, 26 Stat. 1512, 1513, T.S. No. 232, at 14. The treaty established the
International Boundary Commission, which was authorized to investigate the causes and
character of changes in the Rio Grande and Colorado River. Id. arts. 4-8, 26 Stat. at 1514-
16, T.S. No. 232 at 15. The Commission was empowered to render binding decisions as to
the locations of new boundaries, subject to the disapproval by either government within a
month of the decision. Id. art. 8, 26 Stat. at 1516, T.S. No. 232 at 18. The name of the
Commission subsequently was changed by treaty to the International Boundary and Water
Commission. 1944 Treaty, supra note 54, art. 2.
71 1944 Treaty, supra note 54, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1219, 1223, T.S. No. 994 at 71.
75 Although article 2 states that the settlement of disputes arising under the treaty is
entrusted to the IBWC, id., a Texas court has held that the IBWC has only fact-finding
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and become instrumental in promoting bilateral cooperation in the
amelioration of environmental crises.76 Despite the ratification of a
comprehensive joint contingency plan for oil pollution accidents, 7
and the reciprocal adoption of IBWC recommendations relating to
border sanitation problems,78 the responsibility for resolving pollu-
tion disputes remains with the respective governments.79 Indeed,
the IBWC requires the permission of both governments to take ac-
tion, even in the most severe environmental crises.8 0 The IBWC,
therefore, cannot provide redress for a person injured by trans-
boundary pollution. When, for example, an oil rig controlled by a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Mexican Government exploded and
released 3,000,000 barrels of oil into the Bay of Campeche, 81 the
power. San Lorenzo Title & Improvement Co. v. City Mortgage Co., 48 S.W.2d 310, 314
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932); see Note, supra note 35, at 503; Effluent Neighbors, supra note 60, at
165 n.79.
71 See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 35, at 506.
77 See Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by
Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances, March 30, 1981, United
States-Mexico, art. 8, - U.S.T. , T.I.S. No. 10021 [hereinafter cited as Joint Con-
tingency Plan].
78 See, e.g., Minute 264 of the International Boundary and Water Commission Concern-
ing Recommendations for the Solution of the New River Border Sanitation Problem at
Calexico, California-Mexicali, Baja California Norte, Aug. 26, 1980, United States-Mexico,
- U.S.T. - T.I.A.S. No. 9918 (establishing qualitative standards for New River and
methods by which to monitor it) [hereinafter cited as Minute 264]; Minute 261 of the Inter-
national Bountlary and Water Commission Concerning Recommendations for the Solution
to the Border Sanitation Problem, Sept. 24, 1979, United States-Mexico, recommendations
3-7, 31 U.S.T. 5099, T.LA.S. No. 9658 (recommending that, inter alia, the United States and
Mexico give authority to IBWC to exercise jurisdiction over sanitation works along the bor-
der of each country) [hereinafter cited as Minute 261]; Agreement Confirming Minute No.
242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission Setting Forth a Permanent and
Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Ex-
change of Notes, Aug. 30, 1973, United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708
(establishing maximum levels of salinity for Colorado River) [hereinafter cited as Minute
242].
7' See, e.g., Minute 264, supra note 78, recommendation 1 (recommending that the
countries prepare plans to eliminate domestic and industrial waste discharge in the New
River); Joint Contingency Plan, supra note 77, art. 6 (authorities must recommend to re-
spective governments measures necessary to control pollution accidents); Minute 261, supra
note 78, recommendations 3-7 (governmental approval and action required on each subse-
quent proposal); Minute 242, supra note 78 (implementing measures to enforce maximum
permissible levels of saline in Colorado River relegated to future agreement between the two
countries).
"' See, e.g., Joint Contingency Plan, supra note 77, art. 8 (joint response to pollution
accident "can only be applied when the Parties agree"); see supra note 79.
81 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1979, at 1, col. 1. The Ixtoc disaster is considered the largest oil
spill in history. See Transnational Pollution Agreement Regarding Marine Pollution Inci-
dents, 23 HARv. INr'L L. J. 177, 177-78 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Marine Pollution].
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Mexican Government was able to evade responsibility by asserting
the defense of sovereign immunity in subsequent litigation initi-
ated by American citizens.8 2 The United States was later unable to
obtain reparation from the Government of Mexico for the injuries
suffered by American nationals on the Texas Gulf Coast.83
Thus, notwithstanding increased international cooperation in
protecting the environment, few effective measures have been
taken to provide remedies for those injured by transnational pollu-
tion. Citizens of all three countries are beset by a host of pollu-
tants that range from minor nuisances to fatal toxins.8 4 Foreign ju-
risdictional rules and conflicts of law principles, coupled with
excessive costs, make litigation in Mexican or Canadian domestic
courts a risky endeavor for plaintiffs injured in the United States. 5
The vagaries of internal politics and international relations, the
necessity of sovereign intervention, and the delay involved in
transnational litigation render state-to-state claims and incident-
by-incident diplomatic negotiation and settlement cumbersome
and impractical procedures.8 6 In addition, difficulties in assessing
injury to the state, as distinguished from injury to an individual,
decrease the effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation. 7 Therefore, it
See In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 566-67 (S.D. Tex. 1982). The district court
held that although Pemex was immune from suit, both Sedco, the owner of the oil rig, and
Perforaciones Marinas Del Salfo, S.A. (Permargo), the rig operator, could be sued for dam-
ages relating to the explosion. Id. at 572.
88 See Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567. While Sedco eventually settled the 12 million dollar
claim with the State Department for 2 million dollars, Permargo was never forced to com-
pensate American victims. Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1983, at 52, col. 2.
" The amount of lead in the ambient air in the Mexico-United States border region has
resulted in unacceptable levels of lead in the blood of children in that area, Applegate,
supra note 15, at 1133-34, and the drinking water is contaminated with pesticides, see id. at
1135. In the United States, electrical power plants emit more than 18.6 million tons of sulfur
dioxide per year, Scott, Transboundary Transport of Air Pollutants: Eastern Canada's
Concerns, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SECTION, CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMaIrr-
TEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMON BOUNDARY/COMMON
PROBLEMS: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRODUCTION 45 (1982), and the
pH of precipitation in southeast Canada regularly reaches levels below 4.5, id. at 44. These
levels are capable of killing the aquatic life in 48,000 lakes. Id.
88 See supra notes 11 & 20-30 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text. The American and Canadian Bar As-
sociations have acknowledged that "[n]egotiations cannot, by themselves, constitute an ade-
quate dispute settlements system for two countries with a relationship as close, extensive
and complicated as that of the United States and Canada." Canadian-United States Prac-
tice in Dispute Settlement, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION-CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SET-
TLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE USA 17, 17 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Dispute Settlement].
87 See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 348 (citing Reisman, The Multifaceted Phenomenon
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is argued that there is a need for a comprehensive plan for accessi-
ble and equitable settlement of transnational pollution disputes."8
Binational Agreements
Nations generally abide by the rules of international law and
the terms of international agreements only to the extent that their
interests are served by doing so.s Global agreements cannot satisfy
the diverse political and economic interests of party nations to a
degree that will ensure compliance with their terms.90 In the con-
text of North America, therefore, it is argued that a bilateral treaty
between contiguous nations is the best possible mechanism with
which to provide redress for transnational pollution injury. By in-
corporating their mutual interests in a treaty, adjacent North
American nations can protect their citizens and resources without
unduly inhibiting industrial and economic development.91 A work-
of International Arbitration, 24 ARD. J. 68, 83 (1969)). Transmuting private claims to a
national government requires that a private claimant "presettle" with the claimant govern-
ment by reducing multiple claims to one lump sum. See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 348.
Not only does presettlement usually involve a reduction in the amount paid to an individual
claimant, but also the action is removed from the control of the actual victims. See id. For
example, in 1955, the United States paid $2 million to the Government of Japan for injuries
to Japanese fishermen caused by nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands. Japan-Personal and
Property Damage Claims, Jan. 4, 1955, United States-Japan, 6 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 3160;
see Billingsley, supra note 4, at 348; Nanda, The Establishment of International Standards
for Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 IowA L. REv. 1089, 1098 (1975). It has been
asserted that the awards that were distributed to individual claimants were well below the
amounts that could have been recovered in individual domestic tort actions. See Billingsley,
supra note 4, at 348.
1 See Margain, supra note 28, at 465. In response to the Ixtoc oil disaster, one Mexican
official acknowledged: "[Tihere was no bilateral agreement on which to base a claim for
Mexican responsibility. Consequently, there was a need to devise a legal instrument, bilat-
eral in character, establishing a procedure for compensation of damages caused to either one
of our countries by the other." Id.
Be See Comment, supra note 42, at 122. As a general proposition, nations are reluctant
to enter international agreements and will do so only when the agreements offer "substan-
tial practical benefits unobtainable by national action alone" or when they "involve only
minimal obligations." Bilder, supra note 54, at 554. An international agreement between
parties usually is only as effective as the least interested party desires it to be. Id.
go Global agreements cannot simultaneously regulate the environment, provide for
transnational pollution injury, and embrace the disparate economic needs of developed and
developing countries. See J. DAvEas & B. DAviEs, supra note 3, at 7-8. Criticism of global
approaches to pollution problems is widespread. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 6, at 509
(societies that possess disparate shares of the earth's resources are not likely to cooperate in
formulating cohesive environmental policies under present rules of international law); Eco-
nomic Implications, supra note 5, at 535 (industrialized nations that cause pollution should
bear the costs of abating it).
91 See Bilder, supra note 54, at 554; McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 191. Although pollu-
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able binational agreement thus would create substantial incentives
for compliance.
First, a bilateral treaty could include an express waiver of the
defense of sovereign immunity for pollution caused by the acts of a
government agency.92 Second, a treaty could override local jurisdic-
tional rules limiting access to foreign forums, 3 thus enabling pri-
vate plaintiffs to bring actions in foreign courts for injuries caused
by activity in the foreign country. Third, permanent arbitral tribu-
nals could be established and endowed with the means by which to
enforce their decisions."4 The tribunals then could resolve large-
scale disputes in which responsibility must be allocated among
large numbers of polluting entities.9 5 As the Canadian-American
experience with acid rain illustrates, a polluting nation has a sub-
stantial incentive to delay any comprehensive resolution of an en-
vironmental problem, the major impact of which occurs in another
country.e6 The advantage of establishing a permanent tribunal,
tion is becoming a global phenomenon, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, specific
environmental threats generally are restricted to "geographically contiguous nations," Bilder
supra note 54, at 553.
91 See supra notes 13 & 30-34 and accompanying text. The importance of circum-
venting the defense of sovereign immunity is particularly apparent in controversies between
the United States and Mexico, since Mexican industries usually are federally owned. See J.
HERGE'r & J. CAam, supra note 5, at 72. It is suggested that absolute sovereign immunity
must be circumvented to avoid the extension of sovereign immunity to protect a governmen-
tal or quasi-governmental corporation, as was the result in the Ixtoc litigation. See In re
Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
93 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
94 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 513. A binational tribunal is advantageous to private
parties seeking redress for transnational pollution injury because jurisdictional barriers do
not preclude recovery. See id.; cf. Teclaff, supra note 4, at 563 (special international tribu-
nal should be established in which to press claims against states responsible for pollution).
95 See Dispute Settlement supra note 86, at 18. It has been suggested that "obligatory
arbitration may be the most efficient and equitable means of settlement" of legal disputes.
Id. An international "body with a fairly constant membership may, over time, begin to func-
tion as an organic unit, without regular adherence to divisions by country. Such a body can
thus become a very useful means of fact finding." Id. at 26. Indeed, the American and Cana-
dian Bar Associations have noted with approval the fact-finding abilities of commissions
comprised of a fixed number of representatives from each government. See id. "Mixed com-
missions" are especially useful "where a problem is recurrent or where a situation . . . re-
quires continuous oversight." Id. The Bar Associations also note that mixed commissions
normally lack authority to settle disputes definitively. See id. An international arbitral tri-
bunal can develop fact-finding abilities equivalent to those of a mixed commission and can
apply the finding directly to the settlement proceedings.
" See, e.g., Martin, supra note 41, at col. 3. The action that a government takes in
response to ecological problems depends on the "outcome of the clash of complex competing
political and economic forces." Boczek, supra note 12, at 793. The President of the United
States recently decided to limit American involvement in acid rain reduction to research
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rather than a traditional ad hoc system, is the efficiency with
which pollution claims can be dealt if an arbitral mechanism is al-
ready in place.9 7 Settlements could then be effectively imple-
mented to curtail any ongoing pollution damage.98
A fourth advantage of a treaty is the avoidance of spontaneous
debates concerning the degree to which one country may affect the
internal policies of another. Voluntary agreement between nations
on a preexisting dispute settlement mechanism reduces the neces-
sity of protecting against the appearance of external interference
with sovereign autonomy.9 Parties would risk neither their sover-
eignty nor their international reputations by permitting suits by
foreign nationals for injury to foreign land, and by agreeing to give
effect to foreign judgments-both equitable and legal.100
The focus of a binational treaty on pollution remedies should
be twofold: First, it should provide foreign nationals with access to
the domestic courts of the polluting nation; second, it should es-
tablish a permanent arbitral body to settle large claims for which
responsibility is divided among a large number of polluters.101
The ABA/CBA Draft Treaty
The American and Canadian Bar Associations have adopted a
joint resolution for the negotiation of draft treaties between Ca-
activity. See Martin, supra note 41, at col. 3. Although a formal protest is likely to be lodged
against the United States by Canada, no action is planned to reduce the pollution that
causes acid precipitation. See id.
" See Report to the Executive and to the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar
Association, in AmERicAN BAR AssoCiIAoN-CANADuN BAR AssocuToN, SETTLEMENT OF Dis-
PuTEs BETWEEN CANADA AND THE USA at xl-xli (1979). The United States and Canada have
had difficulty in agreeing on a method of dispute settlement once a controversy has arisen.
See DispuTE Sm'rLE tNT, supra note 86, at 59. Even when arbitration has been agreed
upon, in several cases the two countries have "required complex negotiations to design from
scratch the desired arbitral procedure." Id.
98 Cf. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1907 (1938), reprinted in
35 Abi. J. INT'L L. 684, 685 (1941) (13-year arbitration of transnational pollution dispute,
during which time polluting industry continued to operate).
" See, e.g., Survey of Disputes Between Canada and the United States, in AmERicAN
BAR AssoCIATION-CANADIAN BAR AssoCL4TIoN, SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DIsPUTES BE-
TWEEN CANADA AND THE USA 8, 9 (1979) (common problems with attempts to exercise extra-
territorial jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as Survey of Disputes].
100 See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 195, 206-07, 217-19.
01 See supra note 95 and accompanying text; cf. Recommended Procedures for Set-
tling Legal Disputes, in AzmRIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION-CANADIAN BAR AsSOCATION, SETrLE-
MENT OF DIsPUTEs BETWEEN CANADA AND THE USA 39, 57 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Recom-
mended Procedures].
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nada and the United States.1 0 2 The treaties, if ratified, would re-
present a considerable step forward in the resolution of transna-
tional pollution problems. The first treaty-Draft Treaty on a
Regime of Equal Access and Remedy in Cases of Transfrontier
Pollution (Treaty I)10a -focuses on the equalization of transna-
tional access to domestic courts. The clear purpose of the treaty is
to open the domestic courts of the polluting nation to foreign vic-
tims.104 No additional substantive rights, however, are granted to
foreign nationals under the treaty; they are still restricted to the
remedies and theories of liability of a domestic plaintiff.105
The Draft Treaty on a Third-Party Settlement of Disputes
(Treaty II),108 adopted concurrently with Treaty I, proposes the es-
tablishment of ad hoc tribunals to settle disputes concerning treaty
obligations. 10 7 Treaty II empowers the tribunals to render binding
arbitral decisions or non-binding advisory opinions upon mutual
102 See AmERIcAN BAR AssoCIATION-CA ADIAN BAR AssOCIATION, SETTLEMENT OF Dis-
PUt'ES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE USA at vii-ix (1979) [hereinafter cited as SE rMIrNT OF
DIsPUTEs].
203 Sept. 29, 1979, reprinted in SELrmEmENT OF DisPuTas, supra note 102, at xii-xix
[hereinafter cited as Treaty I].
104 See Introduction, in SETTLEMENT OF DisPUTs, supra note 102, at ix. Article 2(a) of
Treaty I provides in part:
The Country of origin shall ensure that any natural or legal person resident in the
exposed Country, who has suffered transfrontier pollution, shall at least receive
equivalent treatment to that afforded in the Country of origin ....
Treaty I, supra note 103, art. 2(a).
105 See Treaty I, supra note 103, art. 5. The drafter of the treaty designed article 5 to
prevent foreign residents from being placed in a situation in which they are better able to
enforce pollution laws than the citizens of the polluting country. Recommended Procedures,
supra note 101, at 55. However, the proposed regime is "not in any way addressed to the
substantive law to be applied in transfrontier cases." Id.
I" Sept. 29, 1979, reprinted in SETTLEENmT OF DisPuTEs, supra note 102, at xxi-xxv
[hereinafter cited as Treaty H].
1o See id. art. 2. The proposed treaty provides for compulsory jurisdiction of a third-
party settlement authority over "any question of interpretation, application or operation of
a treaty in force" between the two countries. Id. art. 1. Article 2 provides that the parties,
by agreement, can submit disputes over other matters to third-party settlement. Id. art. 2.
The Bar Associations' list of subjects appropriate for arbitration includes:
a. pecuniary claims in respect of losses or damage sustained by one of the Parties
or its nationals as a result of acts or omissions of, or attributable to, the other
Party; b. immunities of States and of their agencies and subdivisions; c. privileges
and immunities of Heads of States, Foreign Ministers, and other high officials; d.
consular privileges and immunities; e. treatment of the other Party's nationals; f.
environmental issues; g. the management of natural resources of common interest;
and h. transnational application of civil and criminal laws.
Id. art. 2(1).
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request of the parties. 10 8 The appointment of the ad hoc tribunal,
however, requires the involvement of both governments in each
claim.' 0 9 Perhaps more significantly, no enforcement provisions are
provided in the treaty.1" 0 Although the treaties represent substan-
tial progress in the direction of private redress for pollution injury,
it is suggested that the proposals do not extend far enough in de-
lineating the rights and responsibilities on either side of the
border.
By analogy, the proposed treaties could be applied to pollution
that crosses the United States-Mexico border."' However, the eco-
nomic utility of local polluting industries differs both among the
border regions on the North American continent, and between the
areas on each side of the border." 2 Acceptable levels of pollution,
and -the degree and nature of pollution injury, therefore, should be
defined in each respective bilateral pollution agreement both by
analyzing the amount and character of industrial activity within a
given area, and by evaluating the area's potential for industrial
development." 13
A Strict Liability Alternative
It is submitted that industrial diversity on North American
108 See id. arts. 9, 10.
1o See id. art. 3. The proposal requires that unless the parties otherwise agree, a new
tribunal will be constituted to arbitrate each dispute. Id. The procedure stipulates that each
Government shall appoint a member of the tribunal and that both parties shall agree on the
appointment of the tribunal Chair. Id. art. 3(a). The countries also may agree to allow the
Chair to be appointed by the President of the ICJ. Id.
110 See id. art. 9(1). The drafters of the treaty acknowledged that "[iun some case, the
tribunal might decide that, for example, a piece of legislation or a domestic judicial decision
was contrary to international law. In such a case, the executive branch might not be able to
ensure reversal of a decision or enactment of a new legislation by another branch of govern-
ment or by a political subdivision." Recommended Procedures, supra note 101, at 86-87.
Although the arbitral decisions of the tribunal bind the parties to compliance, see Treaty II,
supra note 106, art. 9(1), the party seeking specific enforcement of an equitable decision
may be relegated to pecuniary damages. See Recommended Procedures, supra note 101, at
87.
I Cf. Recommended Procedures, supra note 101, at 58 (proposed settlement proce-
dures between United States and Canada "can provide a model for other countries which
are not able to resolve differences amicably"). The feasibility of the proposed treaties is
reinforced by the compatible federal structure of the Canadian and American Governments.
See id. at 41. Mexico also is a federal state and, therefore, may also be amenable to inclu-
sion as a party to treaties similar to those proposed by the Canadian and American Bar
Associations. See J. HERGET & J. Csmm, supra note 5, at 19.
III See Bath, supra note 26, at 1147; McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 197.
118 See R. SANsoM, supra note 6, at 66-67.
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borders can be addressed adequately by imposing a standard of
strict liability on polluting industries.114 A strict liability standard
will allow industries and nations to weigh the benefit of a polluting
activity against the injury caused by pollution. 15 No longer will a
nation be permitted to transfer the damage of pollution across a
border without bearing the cost of doing so. 116 A negligence theory
of liability would prove insufficient in an international arena be-
cause an industry need only prove compliance with applicable gov-
ernment regulations to avoid liability for pollution injury.11 7 Envi-
11 See Note, International Liability and Primary Rules of Obligation: An Application
to Acid Rain in the United States and Canada, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 111, 116-17
(1983); cf. Teclaff, supra note 4, at 564 (state should be held liable for polluting activities of
its residents despite absence of fault on the part of the sovereign).
15 See Comment, Uniformity is the Solution to Water Pollution, 23 S. Tx. L.J. 417,
442 (1982). One commentator posits that pollution is an economic phenomenon-it is less
costly for an industry to pollute the environment than to preserve it for future generations.
Id. Although an argument can be made that the costs of defending against transnational
pollution injury actions or paying "industry-wide" damages may be as prohibitive as the
costs of complying with legislative mandates, several alternatives are available to polluting
industries to help mitigate the economic implications of strict liability. See generally
Milhollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental Harm, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 12-25
(1979) (evaluating surety bonding, insurance, and liability funds). Professor Milhollin as-
serts that because surety bonds are, without exception, "set for fixed amounts and fixed
periods of time," surety bonding is not a feasible solution to long-term environmental dam-
age. See id. at 13. Traditional commercial methods of insuring against potential liability are
not likely to be implemented because of the "lack of actuarial experience upon which to
base premiums, as well as the fact that the harm involved is a type of incremental degrada-
tion and therefore not classifiable as an 'accident.'" Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). However,
if the insurance program were underwritten by the several states, pollution injury insurance
could be a device adaptable to potential environmental damage. Id. Professor Milhollin ex-
pressed that "insurance might also cause the industry to regard the premium as a substitute
for careful operations." See id. at 16. It is submitted that such an outcome can be avoided
by providing penalty clauses for negligence in the plan.
Professor Milhollin maintains that "a state-administered [liability] fund could ... im-
pose strict liability and adopt rules of causation favorable to victims." Id. The liability fund
would become a condition precedent to the acquisition of a license to operate. Id. at 22. The
amount of contribution would be determined by "the degree of risk which the activity poses,
and the feasibility of apportioning contributions equitably among the enterprises which en-
gage in it." Id. The amount of the fund itself would be determined by the legislature as a
function of the "magnitude of the risk and the ability of those engaging in the activity to
pay." Id. at 23. For a detailed discussion of the liability fund proposal, see id. at 16-25.
16 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17 See Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of Interna-
tional Law, 14 INT'L & Comp'. L.Q. 1189, 1197 (1965). Although Professor Goldie's disap-
proval of fault liability is within the context of a discussion of space activity, see id., he
notes that much of his article is applicable to transnational problems, see id. at 1189-90.
Even assuming that equivalent legislation can be enacted in adjacent nations, see Legal
Implications, supra note 5, at 567, proving negligence is likely to be difficult, see, e.g.,
Fischer, supra note 1, at 57-58 (debate on cause and effect relationship between sulfur diox-
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ronmental regulations could, and probably would, differ among the
party nations.11 Therefore, industries in a country with more len-
ient regulations would be able to shift the burden of pollution to a
contiguous neighbor.119 Similarly, a public nuisance theory of lia-
bility would not further the interests of pollution victims since few,
if any, plaintiffs could meet the burden of proving injury distinct
from that suffered by the general public.1 20
Imposing strict liability on polluters in a party nation would
not result in unlimited damage awards or a flood of spurious suits,
since a plaintiff would still have the burden of proving that the
defendant's polluting activity is the proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injury.1 21 Even traditional concepts of strict liability, however,
might not be adequate to protect the victims of pollution caused
by a large number of polluters.1 22 Thus, it has been suggested that
a regime of strict enterprise liability be implemented to redress in-
juries caused by geographically diffuse pollution, such as acid rain
and ocean dumping.1 23 By employing enterprise liability, a court
ide and acid rain). See generally Goldie, supra, at 1195-98, ("traditional test of foreseeabil-
ity" inapplicable to transnational pollution disputes).
,1B See supra note 5 and accompanying text. In a developing country such as Mexico,
increased productivity is given priority over environmental protection, see Effluent Neigh-
bors, supra note 60, at 169, while environmental protection is a more important concern in
the United States, see J. DAVIEs & B. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 223; supra note 3.
I'9 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Some commentators contend: "the di-
lemma of the polluting industry is not difficult to understand. Pollution control equipment
is expensive, and it adds nothing to the value of the good produced. Insofar as a company is
in business to make money, pollution control is generally bad business." J. DAvIEs & B.
DAVIES, supra note 3, at 96.
120 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 88, at 627 (5th ed. 1984).
121 See Erichsen-Brown, Legal Implications of Boundary Water Pollution, 17 BUFFALO
L. REv. 65, 69 (1967-1968).
122 Acid rain damage is one type of pollution injury for which there are many contribu-
tors but no way to match a specific source with an identifiable injury. See Fischer, supra
note 1, at 57. Given the concentration of industry along areas of the Mexican-American
border, see J. HERGET & J. CAhim, supra note 5, at 73, and the Great Lakes region, see
McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 197, one reasonably can infer that a similar problem exists
with respect to other types of pollution, see Bath, supra note 26, at 1149; Bilder, supra note
54, at 475. Therefore, if a plaintiff proves injury in fact, apportionment of liability is likely
to be as problematic as is proof of causation, See Fischer, The Availability of Private Reme-
dies for Acid Rain Damage, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429, 456 & n.179 (1981).
,23 See Fischer, supra note 122, at 456. Professor Fischer proposes that application of a
theory of enterprise liability is appropriate to relieve the burden placed on a private plain-
tiff in a pollution injury action. See id. at 455-56, 458-64. Enterprise, or "industry-wide"
liability should attach if "more than one manufacturer of a product is before the court and
each has engaged in the same tortious manufacturing practice." Id. at 458. If, by clear and
convincing evidence, a plaintiff proves that one of the defendants must have manufactured
the product that caused the injury, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendants. Id. It
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can impose liability on a class of polluters in relation to the respec-
tive amounts of pollutants emitted by each member of the class.124
The best mechanism to implement this system is a permanent
arbitral tribunal. With its subject matter jurisdiction limited to
cross-border pollution disputes, it is submitted that the tribunal
would function more efficiently than the federal courts, and would
remain more adaptable to the use of technical experts and scien-
tific data.12 5 The efficiency of the tribunal could be preserved by
imposing a threshold dollar amount on the claims that may be
brought before it.1 26 This, of course, would not bar actions for
small claims, but rather, would require that they be consoli-
dated.1 27 Given its capacity to rely extensively on technical evi-
dence, the tribunal should be particularly well suited to evaluate
claims based on enterprise liability and to apportion liability for
damages in accordance with the pro rata culpability of the
is submitted that enterprise liability should be applied in transnational pollution injury
cases where necessary, not only to ease the task of proving direct scientific causation of
injury by particular polluters, but also to apportion damages among industries that are
strictly liable for the polluting activities that result in an injury in fact to a private plaintiff.
124 See Fischer, supra note 122, at 456. It is submitted that a binational treaty could
stipulate that, upon proof of harm proximately caused by an environmental condition to
which many industries have contributed, a plaintiff from either nation is entitled to com-
pensation from the contributing industries within the foreign nation equal to the percentage
of which the tortfeasors, as a national entity, contribute to the total pollution in the region.
Cf. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 120, § 52, at 345-46 (when two defendants are
liable for polluting a stream, it is possible to apportion damages between them); Preliminary
Report, supra note 54, 28 (innocent victims should not bear the cost of damage caused
extranationally even if caused by faultless parties).
'21 The American and Canadian Bar Associations have noted that an arbitral dispute
settlement mechanism that is "maintained for use as and when required ... has the sim-
plicity and flexibility of arbitration and the permanence and consistency of judicial settle-
ment." Report to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association by the Section of
International Law, in SETrLEMENT OF DIsPUTEs, supra note 102, at xlvii.
120 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1982) ($10,000 jurisdictional amount imposed on diversity
suits). The original purpose of imposing threshold jurisdictional amounts in federal cases
was to "prevent defendants from being summoned long distances to defend small claims." 1
J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.90[4], at 834 (1983) (quoting H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 39 (1953)). This purpose should
apply equally to transnational pollution arbitrations.
127 Accord FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (actions involving common questions of law or fact may
be consolidated and tried jointly); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (class action suits). The jurisdic-
tional amount requirement that attaches to diversity class actions must be satisfied by each
member of the class in some suits. See J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTicE 1984 RULES
PAMPHLET 1 23.15, at 221 (1984). However, because the jurisdiction of the tribunal will be
based on a federal question arising under a treaty, see City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34
U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 234 (1835), no jurisdictional amount attaches, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1982).
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Equitable Relief
One of the most notable deficiencies in existing agreements is
the absence of effective mechanisms for dispensing injunctive relief
against foreign polluting entities.1 2 9 Pecuniary damages typically
will suffice to redress injuries caused by accidental pollution. Ongo-
ing industrial activity, however, causes a continual emission of pol-
lutants which results in ongoing injury.130 If the economic or social
utility of a polluting activity does not offset the damage caused,
injured parties should be entitled to injunctive relief as a matter of
right.13 However, individual rights in international law are subju-
gated to principles of national sovereignty. Thus, the issuance of
an injunction against a foreign national in a foreign nation could
conflict with a sovereign's autonomy.132 Such prohibitive jurisdic-
tional problems may be circumvented only by agreement.1 33
The establishment of a permanent arbitral tribunal through a
128 See Fischer, supra note 122, at 430. It is suggested that only the amount of pollu-
tents emitted by a defendant should be used to determine the percentage of damages for
which he is liable.
122 See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 342; see also Hoffman, supra note 6, at 511.
130 Compare In re Sedco, 543 F. Supp. 561, 572 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (pollution caused by
"history's worst offshore drilling disaster") with Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905, 1980 (1938), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 687 (1941) (pollution caused
by constant discharge of tons of sulfur into the air).
213 See Comment, supra note 42, at 121. Pollution emitted into the environment inci-
dental to, or as a function of, the operation of an industry should be subject to some kind of
abatement procedure. See Billingsley, supra note 4, at 354. The principle of equitable utili-
zation restricts harmful use of a resource only if another's need to use the resource in a
legitimate manner outweighs the need for the harmful use. See Effluent Neighbors, supra
note 60, at 158. The principle not only allows for maximally efficient use of resources, see id.
at 157-58, but also suggests a framework within which to create an international mechanism
for injunctive relief, see Carson, The American Legislative Position, 5 CA.-U.S.L.J. 72, 73
(1982). However, enforcement of an injunctive order issued by an adjudicative or arbitral
body outside the jurisdiction in which the enjoined activity takes place is, at best, difficult
under existing North American agreements and recognized principles of international law.
See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 241. For example, in the Canadian province of New Bruns-
wick, the permission of the Attorney General is required before a claimant may seek an
injunction which, if granted, would "delay or prevent construction or operation of any man-
ufacturing or industrial plant on the ground that discharge from such plant injures some
other interest." Judicature Act, c.J-2, N.B. Rav. STAT. § 33 (1973).
22 See McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 195. Basic principles of international law may pre-
clude successful actions to abate polluting activities. Id. A foreign court that issues injunc-
tive relief from activity in a foreign nation risks the appearance of improperly interfering in
the economic policy of the foreign state. Id. (footnote omitted).
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bilateral treaty, it is urged, is the best possible mechanism to tran-
scend jurisdictional problems in the development of equitable rem-
edies.. 4 However, given the reluctance of the North American
nations to delegate sovereign authority to a "supranational organi-
zation," accession to a treaty that provides for automatic access to
binding arbitration is unlikely. " It is suggested, therefore, that
the tribunal be provided with the authority to petition the courts
of either signatory for original jurisdiction over such a claim.13 6
The decisions of the tribunal should then be enforceable by the
courts of each signatory as if the judgment were rendered by a do-
mestic court of the polluter's domicile.13 7 Because the countries
11 See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 513. One commentator has stated: "International bor-
ders present no problems of competence to a duly constituted international tribunal." Id.;
see Treaty II, supra note 106, art. 5.
135 See Teclaff, supra note 4, at 563; cf. Hoffman, supra note 6, at 510. The trend to-
ward the establishment of administrative agencies on the domestic level is well recognized.
See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 541-42. There also has been a recent tendency toward utiliza-
tion of administrative methods for resolving complex environmental issues in non-adjudica-
tory settings. See J. DAVIES & B. DAviEs, supra note 3, at 169. But cf. Teclaff, supra note 4,
at 564 (present world legal order reduces the possibility that an international tribunal would
be empowered to mediate private pollution claims). Because the littoral states and provinces
of the United States and Canada, and not the federal governments, hold title to the respec-
tive portions of the Great Lakes, see Comment, supra note 42, at 117-18, representation on
a permanent arbitral tribunal established pursuant to a transnational pollution treaty might
resemble that of the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, which includes representations from
each littoral sovereign, state and province, see Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality,
Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, art. 8, 30 U.S.T. 1383, 1394 T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
146 See Bilder, supra note 54, at 549. Supranational organizations are a hybrid of fed-
eral and international structure. See Kunz, supra note 36, at 697. The organization's power
is derived from limited transfers of sovereignty by the party nations. Id. Ideally, transna-
tional pollution claims should be either arbitrated or adjudicated by a supranational struc-
ture with original and independent jurisdiction over such claims. Cf. Bilder, supra note 54,
at 547 (comprehensive, supranational Great Lakes authority needed for purposes of regula-
tion). However, not only are the North American nations indisposed toward relinquishment
of sovereign authority, see Comment, supra note 42, at 125, but also membership by the
United States in a supranational organization would require a constitutional amendment to
remove "treaties from the purview of judicial review," P. HAY, FEDRALISM AND SuRps A-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 268 n.236 (1966) (citing Deener, Treaties, Constitutions and Judicial
Review, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 12 (1964)).
'17 Cf. Bilder, supra note 54, at 551 (authority of International Joint Commission may
be expanded to include the authority to petition the party nations for references of investi-
gation); Comment, supra note 42, at 122 (compulsory arbitration promotes reasonable set-
tlement of co-riparian pollution disputes). It is suggested that the fact-finding abilities of
the Joint Commission and the IBWC will minimize the likelihood of frivolous suits. Cf.
Marine Pollution, supra note 81, at 184 n.66 (discussion of the advantage of information
gathering provisions incorporated into Mexican-American Joint Contingency Plan for oil
pollution accidents). While neither government would be required to abdicate traditional
judicial power, nor be required to modify jurisdictional rules, private parties would be pro-
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have demonstrated a reluctance to accept responsibility for trans-
national pollution generated within their borders,1 3 traditional
"enforcement" methods such as diplomatic and political pressure
may be insufficient to ensure compliance with the proposed
treaty.139 Therefore, economic sanctions for refusal to enforce the
decisions of the tribunal should be incorporated expressly into the
treaty as an incentive to comply with its terms. 40 Unless the terms
of the treaty are fortified with the threat of well-defined and pro-
portionately severe sanctions for noncompliance, the proposed
treaties may be as ineffectual as existing remedies.14 1
CONCLUSION
Until basic tenets of sovereign immunity are qualified univer-
sally, transnational pollution treaties with express provisions for
the implementation and enforcement of private remedies for pollu-
tion injury are perhaps the only means to settle private claims eq-
uitably and consistently. Although steps have been taken to ame-
vided with an alternative forum. Moreover, it is submitted that limiting the jurisdiction of
the tribunal by requiring petitions would quell any reservations relating to "opening the
floodgates of litigation" of transnational pollution claims. See Comment, supra note 4, at
673. Not only would specious claims be screened by both the district court and the tribunal,
but also the difficulty of proving proximate causation between the activity of a particular
defendant and the injury in fact would deter speculative claims. Cf. id.
138 Rejhon, Public Law Approaches, North American Diplomatic Initiatives, 5 CA.-
U.S.L.J. 97, 97 (1982). Governmental reluctance or impotence to delegate power likely would
preclude the issuance of self-executing decisions by an international arbitral tribunal. Na-
thanson, The Constitution and World Government, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 355, 366-69 (1962).
Moreover, the necessity of effective enforcement mechanisms requires that domestic courts
execute the judgments of the international tribunal. McCaffrey, supra note 15, at 195.
29 See Fischer, supra note 1, at 58; Note, supra note 35, at 514; see also Bath, supra
note 26, at 1150 (refusal of both Mexico and the United States to acknowledge their respon-
sibility for air pollution in the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso area). Bilder observes: "Enthusiasm
for stringent pollution controls has lessened as it has become increasingly evident to both
the public and the politicians that effective pollution control will be inconvenient, costly,
slow to produce results, and detrimental to particular industries and communities." Bilder,
supra note 54, at 552.
1,0 See Doud, International Environmental Developments: Perceptions of Developing
and Developed Countries, 12 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 520, 521, 524 (1972). Notwithstanding con-
sent to a third party dispute settlement procedure, it is conceivable that a nation might
refuse to implement the decision of an international tribunal if that decision effectively
qualified the right of a nation or its nationals to exploit natural resources. See Comment,
supra note 55, at 353.
141 Accord Doud, supra note 140, at 524. It has been stated that "the important ques-
tion is not whether there will be an agreement, but whether it will be a thorough and effec-
tive one. . . ." See Note, supra note 114, at 126 n.100 (quoting The Crisis of Acid Rain,
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEs, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 9).
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liorate specific problems resulting from domestic and transnational
pollution, remedies that are reasonably accessible to private parties
have not been established. The result is a continuing deterioration
of the environment and an inequitable shift in the cost of pollution
from the polluter to the victim. Basic principles of sovereignty,
coupled with obsolete jurisdictional obstacles, impede the just res-
olution of transnational pollution disputes. Existing international
agreements are unlikely to change significantly the flaws in the ex-
isting remedial structure. Rather, the situation demands the devel-
opment of new international agreements that eliminate jurisdic-
tional barriers in the domestic courts of polluting nations.
Moreover, nations must establish an alternative avenue of redress
in the form of an arbitral tribunal with binding authority to im-
pose strict liability, to satisfy damage awards, and to enforce in-
junctive relief.
Lynn Theresa Cahalan
